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SOURCE: AFI

India’s decision to walk out of the 5th Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) program with Russia, a joint venture aimed at co-developing and producing nearly 144 cutting-edge stealth jets for the Indian Air Force (IAF), has had long-lasting consequences. While the decision was reportedly based on several factors, including delays, cost concerns, and differences over technological transfer, the absence of a strong backup plan has left a significant gap in the IAF’s modernization plans and its ability to maintain squadron strength.

This move, which might have seemed strategically necessary at the time, now seems ill-conceived in hindsight, given the pressing need to replace aging fleets and ensure the IAF can meet future operational demands.

India and Russia’s FGFA program, based on Russia’s Su-57 platform, was envisioned as a solution to India’s long-term fighter requirements. The plan was to co-develop a variant of the Su-57 that would cater to Indian needs and produce 144 units of these 5th-generation stealth fighters. This would have significantly bolstered the IAF’s capabilities, bringing stealth technology, advanced avionics, supercruise capability, and enhanced survivability into India’s air combat fleet.

However, the Indian government, driven by concerns over the project’s timeline, perceived technological shortfalls, and escalating costs, decided to pull out of the program in 2018. At the time, India questioned whether the Su-57 was a true 5th-generation aircraft and raised concerns about insufficient Russian willingness to transfer key technologies. While these concerns may have been valid, the decision was not followed by an immediate alternative plan to secure a similar class of aircraft for the IAF.

One of the most immediate consequences of walking out of the FGFA program is its effect on the IAF’s squadron strength. India’s fighter squadrons are under immense pressure due to the rapid retirement of older jets like the MiG-21 and MiG-27. The original plan was for 114 units of the FGFA to complement 114 units of the Medium Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) to fill the gap left by these aging platforms. Together, these acquisitions were supposed to ensure that India maintained the required 42 fighter squadrons to meet the dual challenges posed by China and Pakistan.

As of today, the IAF’s fighter squadron strength is critically low, hovering around 30-31 squadrons, far below the sanctioned strength of 42. The retirement of the MiG-21 Bison and MiG-27 fleets—aircraft that formed the backbone of the IAF for decades—has left a significant vacuum that was to be filled by a combination of new 4.5 and 5th-generation fighters. The FGFA program was a key part of this plan.

The failure to replace these aircraft in time has placed additional pressure on the Su-30MKI fleet, which now performs the bulk of India’s air combat operations. However, even the Su-30MKI fleet, though formidable, is aging and will require mid-life upgrades soon. The absence of the FGFA means that the IAF has no stealth aircraft in its fleet and lacks a true 5th-generation fighter capable of countering modern threats like China’s J-20 and other advanced platforms.

India’s decision to exit the FGFA program was made with the hope that alternative programs, such as the MRFA (Medium Role Fighter Aircraft) and the indigenous AMCA (Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft), would fill the gap in the near future. The MRFA, which seeks to procure 114 4.5-generation fighters, and the AMCA, an indigenous 5th-generation fighter under development, were seen as crucial components of the IAF’s modernization plan.

Unfortunately, both programs have faced delays. The MRFA program, initially intended to complement the FGFA by bringing 4.5-generation fighters into service, has seen slow progress in terms of procurement and evaluation. Meanwhile, the AMCA program, which aims to be India’s first indigenously developed 5th-generation fighter, is still in the early stages of development and is unlikely to be operational before 2035.

This lack of immediate replacements for retiring aircraft is now compounding the problem, as the IAF finds itself stretched thin in terms of operational capabilities.

India’s decision to exit the FGFA program also has broader strategic implications. China, India’s primary adversary in the region, has already inducted its J-20 stealth fighter, providing the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) with a significant technological edge in terms of air combat capabilities. While questions remain over the J-20’s true 5th-generation capabilities, its presence nonetheless alters the balance of power in the region.

By contrast, the IAF’s current fighter fleet is largely composed of 4th and 4.5-generation aircraft, with no true 5th-generation platform in sight. While the Rafale and Su-30MKI are highly capable fighters, they lack the stealth and advanced systems that modern conflicts may demand. This creates a potential vulnerability for the IAF, particularly in contested airspace.

India’s decision to walk away from the FGFA program with Russia might have been based on valid concerns, but the absence of a robust backup plan has left the IAF in a precarious position. The retirement of the MiG-21 and MiG-27 fleets, combined with delays in the MRFA and AMCA programs, has significantly weakened the IAF’s squadron strength. Moreover, the burden on the Su-30MKI fleet continues to grow, as it now serves as the primary frontline fighter for most missions.