SOURCE: AFI
India’s nuclear triad—the ability to deliver nuclear warheads via land, sea, and air—stands as a cornerstone of its strategic deterrence. The Indian Navy’s S5-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are poised to enhance the sea-based leg of this triad, offering a survivable second-strike capability by the mid-2030s.
Meanwhile, the Indian Army’s land-based missiles, such as the Agni-V, ensure a robust first leg. However, the Indian Air Force (IAF), responsible for the air-based leg, relies on aging platforms like the Jaguar, Mirage-2000, and Su-30 MKI, none of which are true bombers. As India modernizes its nuclear posture to counter growing threats from China and Pakistan, the question arises: when the Navy can have the advanced S5-class SSBNs, why not equip the IAF with stealth bombers to bolster the second leg of the triad?
The Indian Navy’s S5-class SSBNs, part of its ambitious submarine-building program, represent a significant advancement over the Arihant-class (S1/S2/S3/S4). With a displacement of around 13,500 tons, the S5-class will be larger than the Arihant-class (6,000-7,000 tons) and the upcoming S4-class (7,000 tons). Powered by a 190 MW pressurized light-water reactor developed by the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), these submarines will carry up to 12 K-5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with a range of 5,000-6,000 km or 24 K-15 missiles with a 750-1,500 km range. Their stealth features, including advanced sonar-absorbing coatings and quiet propulsion, will make them nearly undetectable, ensuring a credible second-strike capability.
The S5-class, expected to enter service in the mid-2030s, will allow India to maintain continuous at-sea deterrence, a critical component of a survivable nuclear triad. With three to four boats planned, the Navy aims to keep at least one SSBN on patrol at all times, capable of striking deep into adversary territory from the safety of the Indian Ocean. This capability is particularly vital against China, whose DF-26 and DF-41 missiles pose a growing threat to India’s land-based assets.
The IAF’s Air-Based Leg: A Capability Gap
In contrast, the IAF’s air-based leg of the triad lags in technological sophistication. The IAF currently employs a mix of aircraft to deliver nuclear gravity bombs and air-launched cruise missiles like the BrahMos and Nirbhay. Key platforms include:
- Jaguar IS: A 1970s-era deep-penetration strike aircraft, upgraded but lacking stealth and vulnerable to modern air defenses.
- Mirage-2000H: A capable multirole fighter, but non-stealth and nearing the end of its service life despite upgrades.
- Su-30 MKI: A versatile platform with long range, but its large radar cross-section (RCS) makes it susceptible to detection.
- Rafale: India’s most advanced fighter, equipped for nuclear missions, but not a dedicated stealth bomber and limited in numbers (36 aircraft).
These platforms face significant challenges in penetrating modern air defense systems, such as China’s HQ-9, S-400, and next-generation radar networks, or Pakistan’s LY-80 and JF-17 Block III with PL-15 missiles. Without stealth, IAF aircraft must rely on electronic warfare, decoys, or circuitous routes, increasing mission risk and reducing effectiveness. Moreover, nuclear gravity bombs require aircraft to fly close to targets, exposing them to interception, while cruise missiles like Nirbhay (1,000 km range) lack the range and stealth of SLBMs or ICBMs.
The Case for IAF Stealth Bombers
A dedicated stealth bomber would address these shortcomings, providing the IAF with a survivable, long-range platform to deliver nuclear payloads deep into contested airspace. Stealth bombers, characterized by low RCS, advanced avionics, and large payload capacities, are designed to evade radar detection and penetrate layered air defenses. For India, such a platform would offer several strategic advantages:
- Enhanced Survivability: Stealth bombers, like the U.S. B-2 Spirit or B-21 Raider, can operate in high-threat environments, evading detection by radar and infrared systems. This ensures the IAF can deliver nuclear payloads even against adversaries with advanced defenses like China’s KJ-2000 AWACS or S-400 systems.
- Extended Range and Payload: A stealth bomber with a range of 10,000-12,000 km (without refueling) and a payload of 20-30 tons could carry multiple nuclear warheads, including gravity bombs, standoff missiles like the Nirbhay, or hypersonic weapons under development. This flexibility would allow strikes across China’s eastern seaboard or deep into Pakistan without relying on forward basing.
- Strategic Flexibility: Unlike submarines, which are optimized for second-strike roles, stealth bombers can be used for both conventional and nuclear missions, signaling intent during crises or conducting precision strikes. Their visibility (when desired) can serve as a deterrent, complementing the Navy’s stealthy SSBNs.
- Technological Parity: China’s H-20 stealth bomber, expected to enter service by the late 2020s, will give the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) a significant edge in strategic bombing. Without a comparable platform, India risks falling behind in the regional balance of power.
However, these concerns are offset by the strategic necessity of maintaining a credible triad. Relying solely on missiles and submarines risks single-point failures, while aging IAF platforms will become obsolete against modern threats. A stealth bomber would diversify India’s nuclear delivery options, ensuring deterrence against both China and Pakistan.
China’s rapid military modernization, including its H-20 bomber, Type-096 SSBNs, and DF-41 ICBMs, underscores the need for India to strengthen its triad. With a defense budget of $261 billion (2024) and a growing nuclear arsenal (164 warheads per SIPRI 2024), China poses a long-term challenge. Pakistan’s expanding arsenal (170 warheads) and Chinese-supplied platforms like the Hangor-class submarines further complicate India’s security environment. A stealth bomber would give the IAF the ability to hold at risk key targets, such as China’s naval bases in Djibouti or Pakistan’s Gwadar port, enhancing deterrence.
Moreover, India’s “No First Use” policy emphasizes a credible second-strike capability. While S5 SSBNs ensure survivability at sea, a stealth bomber would provide a complementary air-based option, reducing dependence on any single leg of the triad. This is critical in a scenario where land-based missiles are targeted by preemptive strikes or submarines face anti-submarine warfare threats.
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