SOURCE: AFI
India’s Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), envisioned as the nation’s first indigenous 5th-generation stealth fighter, was meant to propel the Indian Air Force (IAF) into the elite league of advanced air forces. However, bureaucratic inertia, misplaced priorities, and a lack of vision from the IAF’s top brass have significantly delayed the program, allowing Pakistan to potentially take the lead in procuring 5th-generation fighters.
The IAF’s initial focus on the Indo-Russian Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) program and subsequent obsession with the French Rafale jet relegated the AMCA to an “unwanted child,” undermining India’s strategic autonomy in aerospace. As Pakistan accelerates its pursuit of advanced fighters, possibly the Chinese J-31/FC-31, India’s AMCA remains years from fruition, exposing critical gaps in foresight and execution.
The AMCA’s Troubled Journey: A Timeline of Delays
The AMCA program, spearheaded by the Defence Research and Development Organisation’s (DRDO) Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), has faced a tortuous path since its inception:
- Announcement (2008): The ADA proposed the AMCA as a twin-engine, stealth-capable multirole fighter to replace aging MiG-29s and Mirage 2000s, complementing the Tejas LCA.
- Program Launched (2010): The ADA formally initiated the AMCA project, targeting a 5th-generation platform with supercruise, stealth, and advanced avionics.
- Design Phase (2013): Preliminary design work began, focusing on aerodynamic configuration and stealth features, with the IAF specifying a 25-tonne aircraft.
- Ninth & Final Design Configuration (2014): After evaluating multiple configurations, the ADA finalized a delta-wing, tailless design with internal weapons bays.
- Preliminary Design Review (PDR) (2021): The PDR was completed, validating the aircraft’s conceptual framework, but funding and IAF commitment remained lukewarm.
- System-Level Critical Design Review (CDR) (2023): Detailed subsystem designs were reviewed, yet the IAF’s focus on foreign acquisitions slowed progress.
- Fully Sanctioned (2024): The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) approved ?15,000 crore for prototype development, marking a belated commitment.
- AMCA Program EM Approved (2025): The Expenditure Management (EM) approval in February 2025 greenlit five prototypes, with the first flight targeted for 2028–29.
Despite these milestones, the AMCA’s progress has been glacial, with the first operational squadron not expected before 2035—over 25 years after its announcement. This contrasts sharply with Pakistan’s aggressive pursuit of 5th-generation fighters, potentially through China’s Shenyang J-31/FC-31, which could enter service by 2030.
The IAF’s Missteps: FGFA and Rafale Obsessions
The IAF’s lack of vision is rooted in two critical miscalculations: its fixation on the FGFA program with Russia and its subsequent pivot to the Rafale.
The FGFA Debacle (2007–2018): In 2007, India and Russia signed an agreement to co-develop a 5th-generation fighter based on the Sukhoi Su-57 (T-50 PAK FA). The IAF, enamored by the promise of a ready-made stealth platform, diverted resources and attention from the AMCA. However, the FGFA program was plagued by disagreements over technology transfer, stealth capabilities, and costs, estimated at $30 billion for 144 jets. By 2018, India withdrew, citing the Su-57’s inadequate stealth, unreliable engines, and Russia’s reluctance to share critical technologies. The decade-long distraction left the AMCA underfunded and underprioritized, with the ADA struggling to secure even basic design approvals.
The Rafale Obsession (2012–Present): Post-FGFA, the IAF shifted its focus to the French Rafale, a 4.5-generation fighter. The 2016 deal for 36 Rafales at ?59,000 crore, followed by discussions for 114 more under the Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) program, consumed significant budgetary and strategic bandwidth. The IAF’s top brass, prioritizing immediate operational needs over long-term indigenous development, treated the AMCA as a secondary project. This obsession with Rafale, driven by its proven performance (notably in Operation Sindoor, May 2025), delayed critical AMCA milestones, including engine selection and prototype funding.
The IAF’s preference for foreign platforms reflects a risk-averse mindset, skeptical of indigenous programs like the Tejas, which faced similar neglect but proved its worth. The AMCA, requiring advanced technologies like stealth coatings, active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars, and supercruise-capable engines, demanded unwavering commitment, which the IAF failed to provide until external pressures—namely Pakistan’s advancements—forced a course correction.
Despite these milestones, the AMCA’s progress has been glacial, with the first operational squadron not expected before 2035—over 25 years after its announcement. This contrasts sharply with Pakistan’s aggressive pursuit of 5th-generation fighters, potentially through China’s Shenyang J-31/FC-31, which could enter service by 2030.
Pakistan’s pursuit of 5th-generation fighters, likely the Chinese J-31/FC-31, underscores the IAF’s strategic blunder. The J-31, developed by Shenyang Aircraft Corporation, features stealth, supercruise, and advanced sensors, with an estimated unit cost of $70 million—far less than Western alternatives like the F-35 ($110 million). Reports from idrw.org and defense forums suggest Pakistan is negotiating with China for 30–40 J-31s, potentially operational by 2030, bolstered by its JF-17 Block III program and Chinese technological support. The J-31’s export variant, the FC-31, is also being marketed to countries like Saudi Arabia, giving Pakistan a strategic edge in regional airpower.
The IAF’s indecision has cost India dearly. The AMCA’s delays have left the IAF reliant on Su-30MKIs and a shrinking fleet of 4th-generation fighters, with only 31 squadrons against a sanctioned strength of 42. Pakistan’s potential 5th-gen edge could tilt the balance in future conflicts, especially after the IAF’s dominance in Operation Sindoor exposed the PAF’s vulnerabilities. Economically, the AMCA’s delays have hindered India’s aerospace industry, which could have exported the fighter to friendly nations like Vietnam or Indonesia, much like BrahMos. The program’s ?15,000 crore sanction in 2024, while significant, is a fraction of the Rafale deal’s cost, highlighting misplaced priorities.
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