SOURCE: AFI

France’s Naval Group has publicly criticized Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) for what it calls a shortsighted strategy of transferring advanced submarine technology to foreign nations, inadvertently fostering new competitors in the global export market. The rebuke highlights a growing rift within Europe’s defense-industrial landscape, as companies grapple with balancing collaboration, competition, and national interests in a highly lucrative and geopolitically sensitive sector.
Speaking at a roundtable discussion on France’s defense-industrial base in Paris earlier this month, Guillaume Rochard, Naval Group’s head of strategy, partnerships, and mergers, did not mince words. “TKMS are champions at creating new competitors,” he remarked. “They’ve made extremely significant technology transfers to Turkey and Korea, two nations that are now in the submarine export market.” Rochard’s comments point to a broader concern: that Germany’s export-driven approach risks diluting Europe’s collective edge in submarine manufacturing—a field where France and Germany have long been dominant players.
The critique centers on two notable examples of TKMS’s technology-sharing deals. In 2009, ThyssenKrupp secured a contract to supply Turkey with six submarines featuring air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems based on its proprietary HDW fuel cell technology. These Type 214 submarines, built by Turkey’s Gölçük Naval Shipyards near Izmit, resulted in the Reis-class—a fleet designed to enhance Turkey’s underwater capabilities in the Mediterranean and Black Sea. The first Reis-class boat entered service in August 2024, marking a milestone in Turkey’s naval ambitions.
More significantly, Turkey leveraged this collaboration to propel its domestic industry forward. In November 2024, Ankara announced the start of construction on its first fully indigenous submarine, a project that builds on the expertise and infrastructure gained from the TKMS partnership. With this step, Turkey is on track to achieve self-sufficiency in submarine design and production, potentially positioning it as a future exporter—a development Rochard sees as a direct consequence of Germany’s technology transfers.
South Korea offers another case study in TKMS’s impact. Beginning in the early 2000s, ThyssenKrupp provided the design and key components for South Korea’s Class 214 submarines, which were constructed by Hyundai Heavy Industries and Hanwha Ocean (formerly Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering). The first two boats of this AIP-equipped fleet were commissioned in 2008, bolstering South Korea’s naval deterrence against North Korea. Since then, Seoul has capitalized on this foundation to develop its own submarine-building prowess.
Today, South Korea is a formidable player in the global market, exporting its KSS-III submarines—designed with significant indigenous input—to countries like Indonesia. The KSS-III, featuring advanced AIP systems and vertical launch capabilities, owes part of its technological lineage to the TKMS collaboration. For Naval Group, this evolution underscores how TKMS’s willingness to share expertise has seeded competition that now challenges European vendors, including France, in key export regions like Southeast Asia.
The disagreement between Naval Group and TKMS reflects divergent philosophies in Europe’s defense industry. France’s Naval Group, closely tied to the French state (which holds a controlling stake), prioritizes retaining technological sovereignty and limiting transfers that could undermine its competitive edge. Its flagship offerings, like the Scorpène-class and Barracuda-class submarines, are pitched as high-end solutions with strict controls on intellectual property. This approach has secured deals in markets like India, Brazil, and Australia (prior to the AUKUS pivot), but it often comes with a higher price tag and less flexibility on technology sharing.
The rise of Turkey and South Korea as submarine exporters poses a direct challenge to Europe’s traditional dominance. The global submarine market, valued at $22.8 billion in 2023 and projected to grow to $34.5 billion by 2032, is increasingly crowded, with emerging players undercutting European prices. Turkey’s ambitions could see it target markets in the Middle East or Africa, while South Korea’s proven track record positions it as a cost-effective alternative in Asia-Pacific. For Naval Group, TKMS’s role in this shift represents a strategic misstep that weakens Europe’s collective bargaining power.
The critique also raises questions about intra-European cooperation. France and Germany have struggled to align their defense-industrial goals, as seen in stalled projects like the Maritime Airborne Warfare System (MAWS). Submarine collaboration has been equally elusive, with Naval Group and TKMS pursuing separate paths rather than pooling resources to counter external competition. Rochard’s comments suggest frustration over Germany’s unilateral approach, hinting at deeper tensions that could hinder a unified European response to rising global challengers.
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