SOURCE: AFI
Rohit Vats, a noted defence analyst known on X as @KesariDhwaj, has challenged a recent report published by The Print claiming a severe shortfall in the Indian Army’s anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) inventory. The article suggested a deficiency of around 66,000 missiles, but Vats argues that this figure is misleading and fails to account for significant rearmament efforts since 2008. Drawing on procurement data and operational context, he asserts that the gap is far narrower than reported, while also critiquing the narrative around India’s ATGM capabilities vis-à-vis its adversaries, Pakistan and China.
The The Print report referenced a 2010 document stating that the Indian Army was authorized to hold 81,206 ATGMs, with a shortfall of 44,000 missiles at that time. Vats counters this by highlighting the substantial inductions that followed, particularly after the 26/11 Mumbai attacks and a pivotal letter from then-Army Chief General VK Singh to the Ministry of Defence (MoD), urging urgent rearmament. “The government undertook a large-scale induction of ATGMs, including direct imports from Russia and manufacture at Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL),” he notes, suggesting that the gap has been significantly addressed over the past 15 years.
Breaking down the numbers, Vats lists key orders since 2008:
- Invar Missiles (T-90 Tanks): A Rs. 2,000+ crore contract with Russia in 2012 for 25,000 missiles, fired from the main gun of the Armored Corps’ T-90 tanks.
- Milan-2T (Infantry): Orders include 4,100 missiles in 2008, an estimated 3,500+ missiles in 2016 (Rs. 925 crore), and 4,960 missiles in 2021 (Rs. 1,188 crore).
- Konkurs-M (Infantry and Mechanized Infantry): Multiple imports post-2008, with BDL achieving 96% indigenization. Known orders include 15,000 missiles in 2009 (Rs. 1,380 crore), 10,000 missiles in 2012 ($250 million), and a Rs. 3,131.82 crore contract in February 2022, likely for 20,000+ missiles, to be completed by 2025.
Summing these figures, Vats calculates that over 80,000 ATGMs have been ordered since 2008. While acknowledging that some missiles may have reached the end of their shelf-life or been expended in training, he argues that the current gap “definitely does not stand at 66,000 missiles” as claimed by The Print. This discrepancy, he suggests, casts doubt on the report’s credibility, hinting it might be “a planted piece meant to pave the way for imports.”
Understanding ATGM Users in the Indian Army
To contextualize the data, Vats clarifies the roles of different ATGMs within the Army:
- Milan-2T: Employed by infantry units for short-range (1.85 km) anti-tank roles.
- Konkurs-M: Used by both infantry and mechanized infantry, with a 4 km range, offering greater versatility.
- Invar: Exclusive to the Armored Corps, fired from T-90 tank guns, with a 5 km range and tandem warheads for enhanced penetration.
This delineation underscores the Army’s layered approach to anti-tank warfare, tailored to specific operational needs across its formations.
Adversary Capabilities: Pakistan and China
Vats also examines the ATGM capabilities of India’s primary adversaries to assess the strategic urgency of the reported shortfall.
- Pakistan: Operating in the western sector, where India anticipates major mechanized battles, the Pakistan Army relies on second-generation (2nd Gen) ATGMs. Its mainstay is the Baktar-Shikan, a copy of China’s HJ-8 (SACLOS, wire-guided, 3 km range), alongside limited numbers of the American TOW-2 (also 2nd Gen). “Pakistan does not operate 3rd Generation anti-tank guided missiles,” Vats notes, suggesting India’s current inventory remains competitive here.
- China: In contrast, China’s ATGM arsenal is more varied:
- Man-Portable: The PLA uses the 1st Gen HJ-73C (a 1960s-era Malyutka derivative) for low-cost, long-range engagements, and the 2nd Gen HJ-8. The 3rd Gen HJ-12 (fire-and-forget, top-attack, akin to the Javelin) is not yet widely deployed, while the HJ-16 (possibly laser beam-riding) aims to balance cost and capability.
- Vehicle-Based: The HJ-10 (10 km, fibre-optic guided, man-in-the-loop) and HJ-9 (5.5 km, laser beam-riding) are deployed in the Western Theater Command opposite India, serving as long-range precision weapons within composite artillery regiments.
Vats acknowledges the need for India to develop 3rd Gen fire-and-forget (F&F) ATGMs with top-attack features to counter these threats, particularly China’s vehicle-based systems. However, he cautions against alarmism: “The most successful ATGM of the Ukraine war is the 2nd Gen, laser beam-riding Stugna-P. Don’t look for ready-made solutions when domestic ones are available, even if not perfect.”
Future Course of Action
Rather than advocating for imports, Vats proposes a roadmap leveraging indigenous systems:
- MPATGM: Expedite trials and induction of the DRDO’s Man-Portable ATGM, a 3rd Gen F&F system, despite its slightly higher weight (14.5 kg), as a Milan-2T replacement.
- NAG/NAMICA: Expand the use of this unique BMP-2-based platform, which has completed trials and entered limited service.
- NAG Mk2: Clarify its status and objectives—whether it enhances range or capability over the original NAG.
- NAG Mk-X: If not already addressed by Mk2, launch a program to develop a domestic Konkurs-M replacement.
- Imports: Limit imports to advanced Spike variants (LR2, 5.5 km; NLOS, 30 km, fibre-optic guided), but prioritize domestic equivalents, leveraging technologies like the man-in-the-loop guidance demonstrated in India’s recent naval anti-ship missile test.
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