SOURCE: AFI

China’s military modernization has taken a significant leap with the development of the Shuiqiao-class amphibious platforms, aptly named “water bridges” (??), designed to bolster the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) capabilities for a potential invasion of Taiwan. These modular, self-propelled landing platform utility (LPU) barges, observed in exercises near Zhanjiang, Guangdong, in early 2025, are engineered to deploy heavy vehicles and troops across Taiwan’s challenging coastlines, bypassing traditional port dependencies.
As China accelerates its preparations for a possible cross-strait operation by 2027, in line with Xi Jinping’s centennial military goals, India faces a strategic dilemma: could this be an opportune moment to reclaim territories lost to China since 1947, such as Aksai Chin, thereby forcing the PLA into a two-front war? This article explores the Shuiqiao barges’ capabilities, their role in a Taiwan invasion scenario, and the feasibility and risks of India exploiting China’s preoccupation to pursue territorial objectives in the Himalayas.
The Shuiqiao barges, developed by the CSSC Offshore & Marine Engineering Company (COMEC) in Guangzhou, represent a modern adaptation of the Mulberry harbors used during the 1944 D-Day landings. These jack-up barges, classified as Shuiqiao-110, Shuiqiao-135, and Shuiqiao-185 based on their hull lengths, feature telescoping Bailey bridges up to 120 meters long, enabling the rapid unloading of tanks, artillery, and troops from roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ferries directly onto coastal roads or beaches. Their self-elevating legs provide stability in shallow or rocky waters, making them ideal for Taiwan’s rugged coastline, where only 14-20 beaches are suitable for traditional amphibious landings.
Recent reports, including a March 2025 analysis by the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), highlight the barges’ role in enhancing the PLA’s over-the-shore logistics. By forming relocatable piers up to 820 meters long when linked, the Shuiqiaos allow the PLA to bypass damaged ports, seawalls, or minefields, delivering follow-on forces after initial beachheads are secured. Their integration with civilian ferries and the PLA’s maritime militia underscores China’s “all-of-regime” approach to a Taiwan invasion, leveraging its world-leading shipbuilding capacity to produce these platforms rapidly—each barge takes just 4-6 months to build.
However, the barges are not without vulnerabilities. Analysts like Timothy Heath from RAND argue that their slow speed and large size make them easy targets for Taiwanese anti-ship missiles or artillery, necessitating air and sea supremacy before deployment. Moreover, their reliance on calm seas and secured beachheads limits their use to later stages of an invasion, not the initial assault. Despite these challenges, the Shuiqiaos significantly expand the PLA’s operational flexibility, potentially enabling landings along Taiwan’s 1,500 km coastline, including near major highways just 30 km from Taipei.
Since the 1962 Sino-Indian War, China has occupied Aksai Chin, a 38,000 sq km region in Ladakh claimed by India, along with other territories ceded or contested post-1947. The 2020 Galwan Valley clash, which killed 20 Indian soldiers, reignited tensions, prompting India to bolster its military presence along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Recent satellite imagery from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) reveals China’s construction of permanent military outposts near Pangong Lake, including a division-sized headquarters just 6 km from the LAC, signaling a long-term commitment to its claims.
India’s leadership, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has expressed ambitions to reclaim Aksai Chin and other lost territories. In 2019, Home Minister Amit Shah declared in Parliament that India would retake Aksai Chin “come what may,” a stance that, while rhetorically bold, lacks practical clarity given China’s military superiority and entrenched positions. India’s military modernization, including the deployment of 50,000 additional troops to the LAC since 2020 and the acquisition of advanced platforms like the Rafale and S-400 systems, reflects a strategic shift to counter China’s aggression. However, the Indian armed forces face logistical challenges in the high-altitude desert of Aksai Chin, where altitudes exceed 5,000 meters, and supply lines are vulnerable to disruption.
A PLA invasion of Taiwan, potentially involving hundreds of thousands of troops, thousands of missiles, and extensive naval and air assets, would strain China’s military resources. The PLA’s Eastern Theater Command, responsible for Taiwan operations, would likely prioritize its six amphibious combined arms brigades, Type 075 amphibious assault ships, and civilian ferries, diverting focus from the Western Theater Command, which oversees the LAC with India. This could create a window for India to launch offensive operations in Aksai Chin or Arunachal Pradesh, forcing the PLA into a two-front war.
Opportunities for India:
Stretched PLA Resources: A Taiwan invasion would require the PLA to commit significant forces—potentially 200,000-300,000 troops, according to some estimates—leaving fewer reserves for the LAC. India could exploit this by targeting vulnerable Chinese outposts or supply lines in Aksai Chin, where the PLA relies on long, exposed routes through Xinjiang and Tibet.
Restive Regions: China faces internal dissent in Xinjiang and Tibet, where India has supported Tibetan units, such as the Special Frontier Force, which proved effective in the 2020 Galwan clash. India could escalate covert operations to disrupt PLA logistics, further straining China’s western front.
Diplomatic Leverage: A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would likely galvanize international condemnation, isolating Beijing. India could rally support from the Quad (US, Japan, Australia) and other partners to pressure China diplomatically while pursuing military objectives.
While a Chinese invasion of Taiwan might appear to offer India a strategic opening, the feasibility of reclaiming Aksai Chin is questionable. The PLA’s modernization, including its deployment of PCL-161 howitzers and Type 19 IFVs in the Aksai Chin region, indicates readiness for sustained operations. Moreover, China’s “all-of-regime” approach, integrating civilian assets like .
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