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SOURCE: AFI

Pakistan’s former Foreign Minister, Khursheed Mahmood Kasuri, has publicly questioned the plausibility of recent claims that Bangladesh might hand over an older World War II-era airbase to China, citing the country’s geopolitical realities. Speaking to Pakistani media in early April 2025, Kasuri emphasized Bangladesh’s unique geographical position—surrounded by India on three sides—as a key factor undermining the feasibility of such a move.

His remarks come amid growing concerns in India over Bangladesh’s warming ties with both China and Pakistan, raising questions about the shifting dynamics in South Asia and their implications for regional stability. This article examines Kasuri’s statement, the context of Bangladesh-China relations, and the broader strategic landscape.

In his interview, Kasuri expressed scepticism about the substance of reports suggesting Bangladesh might cede control of a World War II-era airbase to China. “Bangladesh is surrounded by India on three sides, with only the Bay of Bengal to its south,” he noted, highlighting the logistical and strategic challenges of such a decision. He argued that India’s dominant presence in the region would make it highly improbable for Bangladesh to take a step that could be perceived as a direct provocation to New Delhi, given the potential for swift Indian retaliation or diplomatic pressure.

Kasuri’s perspective aligns with Bangladesh’s geographical reality. The country shares a 4,096-km border with India, with the narrow Siliguri Corridor—often called India’s “Chicken Neck”—connecting India’s mainland to its northeastern states, just 22 km from Bangladesh’s border. This proximity gives India significant leverage over Bangladesh, both militarily and economically, as seen in historical interventions like the 1971 Liberation War . Kasuri’s comments suggest that any move to host a Chinese military presence, such as an airbase, would risk severe repercussions from India, potentially destabilizing Bangladesh’s interim government under Muhammad Yunus.

The speculation about a Chinese airbase stems from Bangladesh’s recent outreach to China and Pakistan, raising alarm in India. Under Yunus, who assumed leadership after Sheikh Hasina’s ouster in August 2024, Dhaka has pursued closer ties with Beijing as part of its military modernization under the “Forces Goal 2030” program. A 21-member Bangladeshi delegation toured China from February 25 to March 6, 2025, at Beijing’s invitation, exploring avenues for economic and defence cooperation, including potential acquisitions of Chinese military hardware . Reports have also surfaced about Bangladesh’s interest in JF-17 Thunder fighter jets, co-developed by China and Pakistan, further deepening India’s concerns .

China’s growing influence in Bangladesh is part of its broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has seen Beijing invest heavily in infrastructure projects like the Padma Bridge and Mongla Port. However, the notion of a WWII-era airbase being handed over to China lacks credible evidence and appears exaggerated. Such bases, like those in Chittagong or Cox’s Bazar, have historical significance but limited modern strategic value without significant upgrades. Moreover, China’s existing military presence in the region—such as its naval base in Djibouti and port access in Sri Lanka—suggests a focus on maritime rather than airbase expansion in South Asia.

India has watched Bangladesh’s realignment with unease. Dhaka’s growing ties with Pakistan, marked by the first direct trade shipment in 53 years on February 24, 2025, and high-level military exchanges, have compounded these concerns . The visit of Pakistan’s ISI chief, Lt Gen Asim Malik, to Dhaka in January 2025, and the presence of Pakistani officials near India’s “Chicken Neck” in Rangpur, signal a historic thawing of Bangladesh-Pakistan relations, often at India’s expense . Pakistan’s military has even described the two nations as “brotherly countries,” a stark contrast to the animosity following the 1971 war.

India’s response has been multifaceted. New Delhi has actively supported Bangladesh’s Army Chief, General Waqar-Uz-Zaman, in suppressing a Pakistan-backed coup attempt in March 2025, demonstrating its influence within Dhaka’s military establishment . However, Yunus’s government has downplayed India’s role in the 1971 Liberation War in new textbooks, removing references to Indira Gandhi and Mujibur Rahman’s collaboration, a move seen as a symbolic distancing from India . India’s Ministry of External Affairs has stated it is “closely monitoring” these developments and will take “appropriate steps” to safeguard national security .

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