SOURCE: AFI
Abhijit Iyer-Mitra, a noted defense analyst, has sparked a critical discussion on India’s strategic approach to potential military strikes against Pakistan. In a recent post on X (@Iyervval ), Iyer-Mitra outlined India’s historical weaknesses in escalation management, the need for public humiliation to deter Pakistan, and the risks of inter-service rivalry complicating operations. With speculation of imminent Indian strikes, his analysis highlights the delicate balance India must strike to achieve its objectives while minimizing the risk of spiraling conflict. This article delves into Iyer-Mitra’s arguments, their implications, and the broader strategic context of India-Pakistan tensions as of April 26, 2025.
Iyer-Mitra identifies India’s primary strategic weakness as its inability to accurately predict escalation dynamics and define clear de-escalation pathways. “India’s great weakness, historically, has been escalation prognostications (how will they respond) & de-escalation pathways (essentially what war termination would entail),” he writes. This refers to India’s challenges in anticipating Pakistan’s response to military actions and planning how to end a conflict without uncontrolled escalation.
Past incidents, such as the 2019 Balakot airstrike, illustrate this challenge. India’s targeted strike on a Jaish-e-Mohammed camp in Balakot, Pakistan, was a calibrated response to the Pulwama attack. However, Pakistan’s retaliatory airstrike and the capture of an Indian pilot led to a tense standoff, highlighting the unpredictability of escalation. While India’s diplomatic and military resolve secured the pilot’s release, the episode underscored the need for better foresight in managing Pakistan’s reactions and defining exit strategies.
Iyer-Mitra argues that merely degrading Pakistan’s military capabilities is insufficient to alter its behavior. “Pakistanis only learn from public humiliation,” he asserts, suggesting that India’s strikes must not only inflict damage but also project a visible, humiliating defeat to deter future provocations. This view aligns with historical analyses of Pakistan’s military psyche, which often prioritizes narrative control and domestic perception over strategic losses.
For example, Pakistan’s propaganda machinery portrayed the 2019 Balakot skirmish as a victory, claiming to have downed Indian jets (a claim debunked by India’s evidence of a downed value=0>India’s military planners must ensure that strikes are not only tactically effective but also resonate in Pakistan’s public sphere, undermining the Pakistan military’s credibility. A surgical strike that destroys key assets, like airbases or terrorist camps, may achieve tactical goals but fail to shift Pakistan’s strategic calculus unless accompanied by a narrative of defeat.
Another critical issue Iyer-Mitra raises is the Indian military’s inter-service rivalry, where each branch—Indian Air Force (IAF), Indian Navy (IN), and Indian Army (IA)—seeks a role in operations, even if it dilutes strategic clarity. “Every branch of the military wants its share of glory,” he notes, warning that if the IAF and IN are chosen for strikes, the IA may push for ground operations, which are “far messier” than air or naval combat.
Ground operations along the Line of Control (LoC) or International Border risk higher casualties, prolonged engagements, and greater escalation potential compared to precision airstrikes or naval blockades. For instance, the IAF’s Balakot strike was swift and contained, whereas cross-border artillery exchanges often escalate into prolonged skirmishes. Iyer-Mitra’s concern suggests that India must prioritize operational coherence over service egos, ensuring that the chosen strategy aligns with the goal of minimizing Pakistan’s response.
Iyer-Mitra presents a strategic dilemma: to limit Pakistan’s ability to retaliate, India must either deliver a minimal, low-profile strike or a maximal, overwhelming blow that preemptively eliminates Pakistan’s offensive capabilities. “Nothing in between” will suffice, as a moderate response could invite a high-casualty counterattack, forcing India to escalate further and risking a spiral. “Assume their response is a high casualty event, what do we do? Knit sweaters?” he quips, highlighting the danger of unpreparedness for Pakistan’s retaliation.
A minimal strike—say, targeting terrorist infrastructure with standoff munitions—might avoid major escalation but fail to deter Pakistan, as seen in past cross-LoC raids. Conversely, a maximal strike, such as neutralizing Pakistan’s airbases or naval assets, could cripple its response but provoke a desperate counter, including missile attacks or, in extremis, tactical nuclear weapons (as discussed in prior analyses). Iyer-Mitra estimates a “60-70 percent chance of spiraling,” underscoring the high stakes of miscalculation.
Iyer-Mitra’s warning comes amid heightened India-Pakistan tensions, with speculation of imminent strikes fueled by recent terrorist attacks, ceasefire violations, or intelligence of Pakistani provocations (specific triggers are unclear from the post). India’s military modernization, including Rafale jets, BrahMos missiles, and INS Vikrant, gives it a conventional edge, but Pakistan’s tactical nuclear arsenal and asymmetric tactics (e.g., terrorism) complicate the calculus. Posts on X reflect public frustration with Pakistan’s actions, with some users echoing Iyer-Mitra’s call for decisive action but others warning of nuclear risks.
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